Cyberfeminism, Racism, Embodiment

Maria Fernandez

The permanence of domination cannot succeed without the complicity of the whole group: the work of denial, which is the source of social alchemy, is, like magic, a collective undertaking. —Pierre Bourdieu

I’m clear now...that there’s a whole range of important responses to racism that are not at the level of argument and at the level of the intellectual...and it seems to me that if I wanted to identify another line of approach to racism, along with the intellectual one, it would be one that said, ‘Look, in the end, people find it easiest to be comfortable with and nice to people with whom they have done things.’ And I would say I would put a lot of faith in children growing up together, not because we’re lecturing them all the time about being nice to each other but because they just grow up together and they form friendships. —Anthony Appiah

Among feminists it is often assumed that no feminist can be racist because of her awareness of gender oppression. Yet, still today, racist attitudes prevent women from establishing politically and personally enriching connections. Among cyberfeminists, belief in the myth of “equality” in the equally mythical realm of cyberspace is widespread. Electronic media theorists and commercial entities alike maintain that “differences” of gender, race and class are nonexistent in the Internet due to the disembodied nature of electronic communication.¹

Because the hierarchies of RL (Real Life) are believed to be inapplicable to cyberspace, discussions of race have only recently been initiated in electronic media theory and criticism. In an influential 1999 publication, Beth Kolko, Lisa Nakamura, and Gilbert B. Rodman observe that in academic electronic mailing list participants studiously avoid and actively silence discussions of race.²
Kolko et al. argue that “outing race” would render more accurately the diversity of cyberspace but they do not specify how making race visible might change existing power relations. In their words: “Cyberspace has been construed as something that exists in binary opposition to “the real world,” but when it comes to questions of power, politics and structural relations, cyberspace is as real as it gets.”

Despite the increasing interest of academics in issues of race and cyberspace (evident in conferences and presentations during the preceding year), the relation of racist attitudes and behavior to electronic communication remains largely unexamined. One explanation for this might be that racist behavior “in the flesh” is still little understood.

In what follows, I will discuss racism in relation to feminism/cyberfeminism and theories of embodiment. Like many other scholars I believe that racism is a multifaceted system of oppression involving ideological, psychological and practical aspects. Here, I concentrate on embodied dimensions of racism because I believe that racism is, in large part, a complex of embodied practices sometimes quite separate from ideological positions.

It may seem pointless to discuss racism at a time in which the biological concept of race has been proven bankrupt by new genetic technologies. Recent genetic research strongly supports the hypothesis of the African origin of humankind, and challenges traditional concepts of humanity by rendering bodies and organisms progressively malleable. While there is potential in these new conditions, this does not mean that racism has ended. Practices based on previous understandings and valorizations of race still dictate social, political and economic agendas. This discussion of racism and embodiment is only the beginning of a larger project. Increased understanding of racist attitudes in the fleshed world is necessary to combat racism and may shed light on manifestations of racism in electronic communications.

**Differences**

The history of feminism suggests that the interpretation of differences in culture, class, race, sexual orientation, religion, and politics segregate women.
Some cyberfeminists believe that it is useless to talk about differences because they can never be resolved. While I believe that the erasure of difference is neither desirable nor even possible, I like to imagine the possibility that differences could be read as something other than alienating or threatening qualities. One of the most contentious differences among women has been race. I use the term “race” not because I believe in its validity as a scientific category but because regardless of how differences are explained i.e. “ethnicity,” “culture,” perceptions of “difference” are still largely based on epidermal schemas.

Racial differences were divisive in second wave feminism. During the late seventies and eighties multiple women theorists of color challenged the universalist assumptions of previous feminisms. Simultaneously, the postmodern/posthumanist stress on difference, anti-essentialism and the politics of multiculturalism redefined equality from “the right to be the same to the right to be different” de-emphasizing inter group affiliations and coalitions.

In the nineties, communications between feminists of color and other streams of feminism improved little. Various theorists including bell hooks and Chela Sandoval ultimately proposed “an ethics of love” as the solution for women’s fragmentation. Indisputably, this is the ideal solution. Yet, to love through difference, to forget misunderstandings and resentments accumulated for centuries is easier wished for than achieved. “Love” is the message that multiple religions have disseminated for millennia with very limited results. Part of the problem is that “love” is not only an ethical decision but also a set of incorporated practices, habitual ways of doing things with one’s body—doing things with other people, “growing up together” as in Appiah’s statement quoted above. During the last decade, fissures along the lines of “difference” continued to be evident in various strains of “bad girl-ism” and in cyberfeminism.

Donna Haraway’s foundational text, “A Manifesto for Cyborgs” was created in the aftermath of painful fractures in the feminist movement. Haraway attempted to mediate antagonisms by invoking a politics of “coalition—affinity not identity” and by basing the cyborg on a model of mestizaje, the racial mixing which took place after the Spanish Conquest of the New World. In her view,
the cyborg could not be subject to identity politics because it was a hybrid of animal, machine and human.

In Haraway’s ironic fiction, the cyborg is the illegitimate offspring of military technologies, socialism, and patriarchal capitalism. The cyborg’s origins are inspired by Mexican American versions of the life of Malinche, Hernán Cortéz’s Aztec mistress popularly identified as mother of the mestizo “bastard race” of the New World. Haraway’s designation of Malinche as “mother” to women of color remains unexplained.

More troublesome than any semblance of historical accuracy is Haraway’s theorization of women of color as quintessential cyborgs. In her view, “women of color” might be understood as “a cyborg identity, a potent subjectivity synthesized from fusions of outsider identities...” As in the work of Chela Sandoval, Haraway’s cyborgs include impoverished women of color working in sweatshops and electronic assembly lines. She posits that “Ironically, it might be the unnatural cyborg women making chips in Asia and spiral dancing in Santa Rita whose constructed unities will guide effective oppositional strategies.” The promise of the cyborg as a sign of emancipation obscures the fact that the union of human and machine that such women exemplify results from sheer necessity. These women work long hours under exploitative conditions at tedious repetitive tasks, which are often physically damaging.

Inspired by Haraway’s text, cyberfeminism developed in various parts of the world. Cyberfeminists championed the union of women and machines discarding Haraway’s socialist-feminist and anti-racist politics. The work of the Australian cyberfeminist pioneers VNS Matrix was practically unknown in the United States until after the group disbanded in 1997. These artists created sensual, feminized and humorous representations of the data world that opposed the sanitized, masculinist imagery prevalent at the time. VNS Matrix’s Cyberfeminist Manifesto (1991) was universalist in character implying that all differences among women were subsumed in the Matrix.

In Sadie Plant’s polemical book, *Zeros + Ones*, women of color form part of a universal conspiracy between women and machines that will ultimately undermine patriarchy. In her view, this quiet revolution has already dramatically
advanced the economic status of women throughout the world, especially in Asia.⁹ Although Plant tells us that the vast majority of electronic assembly jobs are held by women, and that these jobs have “always been low status, poorly paid, sometimes dangerous,” the fact that the work of these “virtual aliens” forms part of a long history of women’s involvement with technology is sufficient to close the argument for Plant. In Plant’s own words, “If she hasn’t had a hand in anything, her fingerprints are everywhere.”¹⁰ Plant seems oblivious of the applicability of this observation to other kinds of invisible female labor including that of domestic servants, sweatshop and agricultural workers. By repeatedly referring to “the cultures of the old white world” Plant also alludes to the undoing of white supremacy, but does not elaborate this idea.

The recent anthology Cyberfeminism edited by Susan Hawthorne and Renate Klein includes articles by women of color but does not discuss directly the subject of race. In sum, race and racism have been more or less ignored in

cyberfeminism. To discuss these issues might help cyberfeminists to develop and sustain diverse strategic and pleasurable alliances. To date, the most prominent cyberfeminist groups in Europe and the United States, are predominantly white despite various attempts to make the groups inclusive.\textsuperscript{11}

**I AM NOT RACIST, BUT...**

Racism is a painful and often taboo topic in most social contexts. In the West, most people accept the existence of racism as an abstract entity but frequently fail to identify its manifestations in specific individuals.

In Western academic theory, racism, both overt and covert, is discussed predominantly as an ideology. Some scholars also investigate psychological aspects of racism, primarily its relation to desire and the imaginary.\textsuperscript{12} Regardless of orientation, most theorists recognize that racism is a multifaceted system of oppression that legitimates the privileges of a specific group.\textsuperscript{13} As a tool of validation for an established social order, racism forms part of our historical, social and cultural legacy. For centuries, diverse media from storytelling to scientific literature, from photography to the World Wide Web, have reinforced stereotypes of specific groups. As various studies demonstrate, the stereotypes of people of color (and of groups construed as such) are often negative and at best, contradictory.\textsuperscript{14}

Because racism is founded on the construction of racial hierarchies some theorists propose to eradicate it by undermining the concept of race. Multiple postcolonial theorists uphold hybridity as the ultimate form of resistance as hybrids presumably elude classification. Noel Ignatiev and his collaborators in the periodical *Race Traitor* encourage white people to become “race traitors” by refusing identification based on traditional racial categories.

The abolition of the concept of race is essential for the development of a non-racist world. Yet, neither hybridity nor the renunciation of existing racial categories is in itself sufficient to end racism. History demonstrates that cultures may exhibit transnational and multicultural elements and simultaneously maintain racial hierarchies.\textsuperscript{15} The examples of colonial Mexico, Brazil and various Caribbean countries demonstrate that hybridity can accommodate
intricate classifications based on skin color. In eighteenth-century Mexico, for instance, there were more than twenty terms to designate racial mixtures. Ignatiev himself admits that the propositions of *Race Traitor* are extremely difficult ones. In order to become “race traitors” people must be willing to give up the privileges of belonging to a dominant group and this rarely occurs.

Multiple theorists recognize that racism entails ideas as well as actions, yet the relation of the psychological and ideological aspects of racism to practices of the body has received little attention. If racism is manifested in actions, then I propose that at least part of our investigations should focus on performance.

To illustrate one example among many, in the United States women of color often report being made “invisible” by their white counterparts. I suggest that the enforcement of invisibility is achieved by means of specific bodily cues and behavior. Consider the following examples:

1. Lila has moved from Guatemala to a small U.S. city in the Northeast. She tells a Chinese-American college friend living in Texas that people in her new circle seem to feel uncomfortable around her: “They do not seem to know what to speak to me about, most of the time they simply pretend I’m not there, they do not talk to me, they do not look at me, they interrupt me when I speak and sometimes they do not respond to me at all. Even people whom I like, nervously cross and uncross their arms and legs and fidget with their fingers whenever they find themselves alone with me. “It’s funny,” the friend says, “I’ve had similar experiences here.”

2. Lupe, a Mexican-American homemaker, begins a small catering business from her home. Her neighbor, Jane, asks to join and Lupe accepts. Within two weeks, Jane has contracted with new clients and invited several of her friends to become partners without consulting Lupe. Within a month, Lupe’s original business plans are transformed beyond her recognition. Lupe quits the partnership and Jane and her friends run her original business. Lupe confronts Jane about not having been consulted in her schemes. Jane admits no wrongdoing and accuses Lupe of “having a chip on her shoulder.”

3. Tina, an artist of Afro-Cuban origin is invited to participate in a prestigious international art festival. On arrival, she is introduced to Ann, an American artist of European descent. At the end of the week, a dinner is organized for the festival’s guests. Tina and Ann are assigned seats facing each other. Tina says “Hi” to Ann. Ann nods slightly but says nothing. At dinner she converses with other people at the table consistently ignoring Tina. Thinking that perhaps Ann
does not recognize her, Tina volunteers “We were introduced at…” “I know,” Ann interrupts and continues to ignore Tina for the rest of the evening.

4. Some years ago, bell hooks visited the University of Florida at Gainesville. At the beginning of her lecture, she reported that several of the local graduate students had enthusiastically suggested that she meet one of their professors, a European-American woman interested in issues of feminism and difference. hooks told the audience that the professor in question had declined to attend her lecture because “she was going to a football game.” Whatever the intention of the professor, hooks seemed to recognize a familiar pattern in her behavior or she would not have brought it to the attention of the audience.

Tina Grillo and Stephanie M. Wildman have argued that white supremacy instills in many whites the expectation of always being the center of attention. In their view, “When people who are not regarded as entitled to the center move into it, however briefly, they are viewed as usurpers. One reaction of the dominant group to temporarily losing the center is to make sure that nothing remains for the perceived usurpers to be in the center of. Another tactic is to steal back the center, using guerrilla tactics if necessary.” In the examples above, Jane took “the center” from Lupe, by failing to consult about decisions with her as is customary among business partners. Ann denied the presence, thus the status of Tina by ignoring her. Similarly, by choosing to miss hooks’ lecture, the other professor temporarily dismissed hooks’ knowledge and authority as well as her position at center stage.

These examples suggest that embodied practices communicating messages of invisibility involve the suspension of rules of behavior that are customarily observed with other members of the same group: Failing to acknowledge a person’s presence or speech, interacting with others in a group and consistently excluding a specific person, failing to recognize someone’s achievements and expertise—i.e., absenting oneself from events one would normally attend when a person of color is the speaker or performer, etc. Such behaviors have ambiguous meanings but they do effectively negate or diminish another person’s presence. It is precisely the multiplicity of meanings that makes these behaviors powerful. If they are ambiguous, they cannot be named. Patricia
Williams has compared racism to a ghost invisibly exerting its influence: “It is deep, angry, eradicated from view, but strong enough to make everyone who enters the room walk around the bed that isn’t there, avoiding the phantom as they did the substance, for fear of bodily harm. They do not even know what they are avoiding; they defer to the unseen shapes of things with subtle responsiveness, guided by an impulsive awareness of nothingness, and the deep knowledge and denial of witchcraft at work.”

EMBODIED RACISM

Theories of embodiment stress the interdependence of mind and body in contrast to the traditional opposition of these entities foundational to most of western philosophy. The integration of mind and body also has been a tenet of various currents of feminism for at least three decades. Feminist theorists including Jane Gallop, Gayatri Spivak, Judith Butler, Luce Irigaray, Helene Cixoux and Elizabeth Grosz view the body as a social and discursive object essential to the production of knowledge, desire and power. Grosz developed a model of embodiment as a Möbius strip where outside and inside are one continuous surface. In her opinion, an ideal feminist philosophy of the body should reveal articulations and dis-articulations between the biological and the psychological and include “a psychical representation of the subject’s lived body as well as of the relations between body gestures, posture and movements in the constitution of the processes of psychical representation.”

Various theorists including Pierre Bourdieu, Michael Oakeshott, Paul Connerton, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have argued for the dependence of beliefs and social values on bodily practices. For Connerton, social memory is lodged in the body and activated through commemorative ceremonies, performances, habits, and body automatisms. For Bourdieu, bodily habits are manifestations of political mythologies that in turn reinforce specific ways of feeling and thinking. Habits function beyond conscious awareness because they are learned through imitation and not by the deliberate application of specific principles. Thus, people’s behaviors often differ from their conscious intentions. Because they are unconscious, embodied practices become
naturalized, immune to questioning, and extremely resistant to change.26

George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have proposed that humans reason with metaphors that develop as a conflation of sensorimotor and subjective, non-sensorimotor experiences. In their view, “the mind is inherently embodied, reason is shaped by the body;” our most valued abstract concepts are conceptualized via multiple complex metaphors, molecular structures made up of atomic parts named ‘primary metaphors.’27 Like Bourdieu, Oakeshott and Connerton, Lakoff and Johnson believe that most of human thought is unconscious. They call the inaccessible aspects of cognition, including our system of primary and complex metaphors, “the cognitive unconscious.” Lakoff and Johnson also believe in the persistence of habit: “Once we have learned a conceptual system, it is neurally instantiated in our brains and we are not free to think just anything. Hence we have no absolute freedom in Kant’s sense, no full autonomy.”28 Although most of the scholars mentioned above stress the inflexibility and resilience of social habits, they also maintain that habits are open to transformation as their performativity implies continuous improvisation.29

It is almost thirty years since the publication in French of Bourdieu’s book Outline of a Theory of Practice, and more than sixty since Marcel Mauss wrote his influential essay: “Techniques of the Body.”30 Given the long trajectory of theories of embodiment, it is striking how little impact this knowledge has had on studies of racism. Traditional understandings of “whiteness” and “reason” as disembodied may have contributed to these omissions. In the opinion of Radhika Mohanram “blackness and whiteness assume the status of the Cartesian body and the mind respectively. Black bodies are represented trapped in the web of nature while white bodies have freedom of movement. Such a freedom disembodies whiteness.”31 Thus discussions of racism in terms of embodiment problematize the oppositions black/white, embodied/disembodied, static/mobile and their attributed associations.

In feminist theory, disembodiment is often associated with white males, but historically, disciplining, restricting and concealing the body played a part in what Kate Davy called the “politics of respectability,” a complex of values and
codified behaviors by means of which white women claimed moral superiority to women of color. In the United States and various European countries, white women also have employed discourses of modernity and mobility to differentiate themselves from women of color. In cyberfeminist narratives, the cyborg ultimately validates the privileges of specific groups as people of color and the poor are either left out of technological futures or coerced into cyborgian conditions.

Racist practices are legitimating performances. In most of the West, whiteness has been construed as a mark of authority and privilege. Some would argue that class is a more significant variable as all groups at the bottom of the social ladder share histories of injustice, abjection and abuse. The brutality of class marginalization can hardly be contested. Often, however, it is difficult to disassociate race from class as the lower classes consistently have been racialized, that is to say, they have been construed as racially different from the dominant groups and often “blackened” (i.e., the Irish in nineteenth-century England; in the twentieth century, Jews, Indians, Pakistanis, Turks, Eastern Europeans, Roma etc.) In many contexts, whiteness still assumes a superior status: Poor whites may be just as economically disadvantaged and socially marginalized as poor blacks; yet, many believe themselves to be superior because they are white. Imprisonment statistics in the United States, England, Australia and France suggest that this dynamic may be operative in various justice systems.

Examining racism as a complex of embodied practices and social habits supported by discursive practices provides a better understanding of the pervasiveness and resilience of racist behavior than theories which privilege racism as discourse. I’m proposing that like other social habits, many racist behaviors occur below the level of conscious awareness. Racism can be performed without deliberation; thus, an individual may vehemently oppose racist beliefs and consistently behave in racist ways. In fact, several studies demonstrate that by three years of age, children express specific attitudes about race but it is doubtful that their actions reflect reasoned ideological positions.

Recently, I had the opportunity to observe a group of four-to-six year olds at a
pre-school playground in a predominantly white, working-class area of southern England. A group of the older children spent the one-hour recess period taunting the only West Asian child (a four-year old) in the playground area. The school has a policy of no hitting, and no name-calling. So the children resorted to surrounding the “black” child in a tight circle, gently but incessantly pushing him, pulling on his clothes, and following him as he attempted to walk or run away. Finally, the accosted child ran to a “forbidden” area of the playground where he was spotted by the teacher and reprimanded. Several of the younger children identified the West Asian child as being inherently “bad” or “naughty.” The teachers reinforced this opinion by admonishing the child while consistently ignoring the behavior of the older children. Several local academics affirm that racism is nonexistent in the school’s geographical area yet in various social contexts (shops, restaurants, buses) in the same area, adults routinely make negative and derisive comments about Asians. The behavior of the older children is likely to be a manifestation of a complex of attitudes that the children emulate but do not necessarily understand. The antagonized child likewise learns a complementary set of behaviors involving self control, defiance, submissiveness, and denial necessary to survival in that social context.

UNLEARNING RACISM

In the sixties and seventies, scholars from various fields identified body language as a system of communication. In their view, body language including posture, gestures, and facial expressions, expressed emotions and thus was a good tool for evaluating and improving personal relations. Second wave feminists also recognized the importance of incorporation. The pioneering book, Our Bodies Ourselves stressed the interconnection of body, identity and empowerment. Consciousness-raising as well as the slogan “the personal is the political” implied the re-evaluation of habitual behavior that contributed to women’s oppression. Feminists challenged traditions of comportment, dress, and speech by virtue of which women were trained to conform to specific social roles. The effects of questioning and changing those habits were profound.
Bourdieu explains that all societies and revolutionary movements that seek to produce “a new man” through processes of de-culturation and re-culturation, place high stakes on “the seemingly most insignificant details of dress, bearing, physical and verbal manners.” In his view, each technique of the body evokes the whole system of which it is part. Thus, “the whole trick of pedagogic reason lies in the way it extorts the essential while seeming to demand the insignificant.”

At present, awareness of body language is regarded as a good business tool: It figures prominently in the art of negotiation for businessmen and in women’s magazines’ advice on how to succeed in the job interview. The Center for Nonverbal Studies, with branches in Spokane, Washington and La Jolla, California, routinely conducts lectures and seminars for businesses and corporations. The importance of nonverbal communication is recognized by law, the police, and the military in assessing the credibility of individuals as witnesses and informants.

Most cyberfeminists concentrate their efforts on the technical and political aspects of digital media and ignore racism. Despite the rhetoric of equality and disembodiment that prevails in discussions of cyberspace, racism is alive in digital spaces in overt and invisible forms. If mind and body are inextricably connected, digital representation, textual and visual, must be affected by embodied practices. Thus it is crucial to identify racism in the lived world if we hope to learn to recognize it in cyberspace.

To identify embodied aspects of racism we must begin by raising our own consciousness, by observing the ways our bodies behave in the presence of “difference.” We must appropriate and refine techniques successfully tested by revolutionary movements, the behavioral sciences, commerce and the military. By acknowledging the power of embodied, nonverbal practices, cyberfeminists can subvert and deploy established forms of discipline to form and strengthen positive, powerful alliances.


3 Ibid., p. 4.

4 Personal communications by several cyberfeminist colleagues at the Next Cyberfeminist International, Rotterdam March 1999 (where Faith Wilding and I introduced a discussion of cyberfeminism and difference).


10 Ibid., p. 75.

11 A group exceptionally committed to international feminist issues are Les Penelopes in France <http://www.mire.net/penelopes>


14 Bhabha, “The Other Question.” For an example of the racialization of class differences in 19th century England, see Anne Mc Clintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest (New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 104-111.


17 Memmi, Racisme, p. 58, 128.

18 Conversely males in select groups, especially Latinos and African-Americans are made “hypervisible” in media representations and this condition translates to everyday situations.

19 All of these examples are from real life. With the exception of bell hooks, the identities of the individuals involved have been changed.


25 Connerton, Societies, p. 3; Bourdieu, Outline, p. 78–81.

26 Connerton, Societies, p. 102.


33 See Roedinger, Wages of Whiteness.

34 World Factbook of Criminal Justice Systems <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/wfcj.htm>


World prison statistics available on-line from: bodega@sprintmail.com
Oakeshott distinguishes between two types of morality: one that is reflexive and discursive and another, which is habitual. Oakeshott cited in Connerton, *Societies*, p. 29.


Bourdieu, *Outline*, p. 94-95.

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